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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Social trust, the confidence people have that strangers on whom they have no specific information about will not take advantage of them, is considered to facilitate long-term growth, democratic stability and subjective well-being. Trust is particularly important in the rural areas of developing countries where formal markets are often under-developed, and the majority of economic transactions take place in the informal sector. Some scholars have argued that the level of trust is determined by schooling and institution quality while others contest that the extent to which one trusts others may depend on factors such as religious affiliation, and/or degree of religiosity. Faith orientation of the school can be also important. Youths may be exposed to schools that limit interaction with other faith groups and operate in segmented communities with limited media access. If so, social capital in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria can be undermined by religious/ethnic diversity among their populations, faith-specific schooling and poor governance. Faith identity is a contentious topic in South Asia where countries are greatly segmented along religious lines. Media reports on communal riots causing deaths and damages to properties in the region are quite frequent. There is a steep rise in religious violence and segregation in India and Bangladesh.
This raises an important question: how can public policy foster trust in socially diverse communities?
We answer this question in the context of Bangladesh, a country well-known for various forms of governance crises, poor quality of public institutions, low level of schooling and the presence of a number of religious minority groups. Hindus for instance account for about a tenth of Bangladesh's total population. Therefore we study the trust attitude between Muslims and Hindus.
The measurement of trust is a contentious topic in the social science literature. Therefore, in addition to using the generalized trust question, we have employed questions to directly capture trust towards specific social groups. In particular, we combine individual and aggregate (i.e. community) level variables to explain inter-personal trust among 2400 household-heads across 96 villages in Bangladesh. The survey was conducted in 12 districts during [2007] [2008] . We use survey responses to a range of questions relating to in-group and out-group trust as dependent variables, and estimate multivariate models focusing on a number of correlates --religious affiliation, institutional trust and religious schooling of individuals, as well as the level of economic development in the village.
Two key questions examined are: (i) Is the "religion effect" significant and specific to certain religious groups and geographic locations?
(ii) How does the effect of community attributes (e.g. religious composition and the level of economic development of the village), perceived institutional trust and Islamic education compare with that of religion?
We find significant social distance among various faith groups in the data: both Hindus and Muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions. Religious minorities such as Hindus trust Muslims more than Muslims trust Hindus. We also find no evidence that Hindus are distrustful of the wider society in general. If anything, they trust nonMuslims of all denominations and NGO workers more compared to Muslims. When compared to religion, effects of institutional trust and local economic development (including presence of NGO activity) are modest.
These findings do not proxy for between religion differences in institutional trust. This is despite the fact that perceived institutional trust increases inter-personal trust in our data. These findings are neither driven by religious identities of the interviews. We do not find that the inter-group trust attitude of individuals is owing to minority/ majority status based on religion. This is because Hindus trust other Hindus and Muslims less in locations bordering Hindu majority India compared to interior regions. However, the lack of trust towards Hindus (and other non-Muslims) is significantly correlated with Islamic school (i.e. madrasa) attendance amongst Muslim respondents whilst religiosity appears to play no role.
The above findings highlight new challenges for Muslim-majority Bangladesh where in recent years there is growing violence against the country's minority populations.
The between-group trust deficit documented in our study could be shaped by the theology of respective religious groups. According to our findings, however, the role of religion in inculcating a trusting attitude is ambiguous. We do not find a direct role of religious observance among Muslims on trust attitudes. This is not unsurprising because all major faiths, including Islam emphasize equality, peace, community service, and responsibilities towards the poor and vulnerable, including strangers.
The Hindu-Muslim differences in trust attitude that we have documented can be driven by the actual experience of people rather than the theology of the particular religions. In recent years, there are growing signs of religious intolerance around the world. In Bangladesh, Hindu priests and teacher have been murdered along with incidents of attacks on Hindu devotees at the temple. Several dozen houses and idols belonging to Hindus have been vandalized. There have also been several other attacks on members of other faith communities which also saw attacks on the places of worship of Shias, Christians, and the Buddhists. Events such as these would undermine between-group solidarity and create mistrust between Bangladesh's two main religious communities, Muslims and Hindus, limiting the scope for creating social capital in the long-run.
It is also possible that existing mistrust towards minorities may be fueling recent communal violence. In this context, improvements in the rule of law and institutional provisions protecting minority rights and livelihoods will be critical to rebuild social trust. In addition, we have highlighted two policy channels for fostering inter-personal trust.
First, the significant association between institutional trust and social trust suggests that policy reforms that reduce corruption may improve interpersonal-trust via increasing institutional trust in rural Bangladesh. Here policy measures against corruption such as social campaigns using the media and school curriculum reform to instill moral values can be effective. Second, while we found no effect of years of schooling, madrasa attendance was negatively correlated with level of trust towards minority religious groups. If this effect is causal, this suggests that social trust can be fostered through appropriate educational reform programs. Curriculum reform targeting Islamic schools can improve generalized trust attitude among one segment of the Muslim population in Bangladesh. Indeed evidence indicates that madrasa students using state approved curriculum show favorable trust attitudes compared to their peers from unregulated non-state madrasas.
Introduction
Trust among members of a society is considered to facilitate long-term growth, democratic stability and subjective well-being (Zak and Knack, 2001; Bjørnskov, 2003; Beugelsdijk, 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Dearmon and Grier, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) . Social trust, the confidence people have that strangers on whom they have no specific information about will not take advantage of them, is particularly important in the rural areas of developing countries where formal markets are often under-developed, and the majority of economic transactions take place in the informal sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Tu and Bulte, 2010; D'Hernoncourt and Méon, 2012 ). Yet the level of social trust varies substantially across countries and is especially low in developing countries (Ahmed and Salas, 2009 ). This raises an important question: can public policy foster trust? According to some researchers (e.g.
Narayan 2002
; Knack and Zak, 2003; Dixit, 2004; Rothstein, 2005; Bidner and Francois, 2011) , the answer is affirmative, since the level of trust appears to be partly determined by schooling and institution quality. At the same time, the extent to which one trusts others may depend on factors such as religious affiliation, and/or degree of religiosity (Tan and Vogel, 2008; Ahmed 2009; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009; Berggren and Bjørnskov, 2011; Sarkissian, 2012; Chuah, Fahoum and Hoffmann, 2013) . In general, there is an emerging consensus that levels of trust are shaped by individual specific attributes, as well as aggregate factors such as local institutions and community characteristics (Wang and Gordon, 2011) .
More systematic documentation of the determinants of trust in varying institutional and demographic contexts can aid in understanding the deeper determinants of inter-personal trust around the world. In this connection, Bangladesh is an interesting case study. The country is well-known for various forms of governance crises (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Asadullah, Savoia, and Mahmud, 2014) , and poor quality of public institutions, which are thought to undermine social trust (Knox 2009 ). Large scale provision of social services through NGOs partly makes up for poor governance in the social sector, and fosters trust in rural areas (Kabeer and Matin, 2005) . This suggests that public policies can aid the process of social capital formation in rural developing countries. This is also true if it is found that the lack of inter-personal trust is driven by community level factors such as economic inequality and level of economic development of a village.
On the other hand, social trust can be undermined by religious composition and low level of schooling of the population. Non-Muslims (Hindus) account for little over 10% (8%) of the population in Bangladesh. All major faiths, including Islam, have doctrinal commitments to equality, peace, community service, and responsibilities towards the poor and vulnerable, including strangers, which can contribute to the development of trusting relationships within the society (Neusner and Chilton, 2005) . At the same time, Muslims may be exposed to institutional environments (e.g. Islamic schools) that limit interaction with other faith groups.
1
This may create distrust between Muslims and non-Muslims although at the same time increasing trust towards other Muslims. Although some of these issues have been studied in cross-country studies using survey based (e.g. Alessina and La Ferrara 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007; Daniels and von der Ruhr, 2010) and/or experimental measures (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008) of trust, research using country-specific large survey data that combines an analysis of spatial, religious and demographic determinants of trust is limited for developing countries.
4
Our paper builds on the existing cross-and within-country studies, and contributes to the limited developing country literature on social trust using a novel household survey dataset from Bangladesh, a poor country with significant religious minority populations and "governance deficit". In particular, we combine individual and aggregate (i.e. community) level variables to explain inter-personal trust among household-heads across 96 villages in the country. We use survey responses to a range of questions relating to in-group and out-group trust as dependent variables, and estimate regression models focusing on a number of correlates: religious affiliation, institutional trust and religious schooling of individuals, as well as the level of economic development in the village. The key questions examined are: (a) Is the "religion effect" significant and specific to certain religious groups and geographic locations? (b) How does the effect of community attributes (e.g. religious composition and the level of economic development of the village), perceived institutional trust and Islamic education compare with that of religion? To the best of our knowledge, this is the first within-country study on the general determinants of inter-personal trust in South Asia that employs a nationally spread out survey data set.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses studies on social trust using developing country data. Section 3 discusses the sample and also explains our survey measure of trust. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
Study background

What we know about the determinants of inter-personal trust
Social trust is viewed by many as a form of social capital. It plays an important role in economic and social transactions. Numerous studies have used country average of the 2 None of the existing studies on South Asian countries employs a data set that examines the role of geography and community characteristics along with demographic factors (e.g. see Ahmed, 2009; Ahmed and Salas, 2009; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009; Chuah, Fahoum, and Hoffmann, 2013 find that social trust facilitates faster human development, but the impact occurs mainly in less democratic countries. Moreover, Horváth (2013) using data for nearly fifty countries, reveals that trust is key to economic growth in countries with a weak rule of law. These two studies thus highlight the importance of trust in a developing country setting where democracy and rule of law is lacking.
There are a number of theoretical explanations for cross-country variation in social trust. Some emphasizes behavioral sources of trustworthiness as a combination of well-functioning enforcement of contracts and cultural transmission of values of cooperation (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008; Tabellini, 2008) . Others point out that institutions improve societal trust by detecting, checking and punishing opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Dixit, 2004) . If true, formal institutions facilitate trust through establishing the rule of law, equitable access to justice, and a police force that protects citizens, while informal (e.g. religious) institutions regulate trust through social mechanisms (e.g. ostracism/shame to those who violate the norms; Narayan, 2002) . However, formal institutions may also have the opposite effect by reducing the marginal returns to being trustworthy and in turn crowding out trust and trustworthiness (Aghion et al. 2010) . While institutions increase the cost of betrayal enhancing people's willingness to trust, they may also decrease intrinsically motivated 6 trust (Bohnet and Baytelman (2007) . Irrespective of the debate on whether the actual effect of institution on trust is negative or positive, there is also a debate over whether social trust has institutional foundations. Some researchers are sceptical that social and political institutions can lead to high societal trust (Uslaner, 2002) . In his critique of Beugelsdijk (2006) , Uslaner (2008a) argues that generalized trust may not be a simple proxy for effective government and institutional quality; instead it can be seen as a moral value acquired early in life and hence resistant to bad experiences in later life. Moreover, low level of societal trust may lead to corrupt governments which in turn further lower inter-personal trust (Uslaner, 2008b Although all major religions call for behaving well to others, religious groups may primarily trust people in their own groups and distrust others, as well as cause division in the broader population. On the other hand, religious minorities may demonstrate a low level of trust as a consequence of violence and discrimination. 5 At the same time, the observed effects can be spurious if religious groups differ significantly in terms of endowment of non-religious factors that matter for trust.
Therefore the role of religion in predicting the level of trusting attitude can be ambiguous.
Beyond religious affiliation and individual experiences (e.g. educational orientation), community characteristics also influence the degree in which people trust each other (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) . Various studies confirm the role of legal 4 There is also a large volume of studies that has carried out laboratory tests on how group membership (religious, social, residential) influence trust (e.g. see Güth et al 2008 , Güth et al. 2009 , Smith 2011 , and Crepaz et al. 2014 . 5 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) for similar evidence for the US. Using US data they find that a recent history of traumatic experiences and belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against are associated with low trust. In sum, although cross-country studies (using country-level or pooled cross section data) and field experiments abound, for reasons related to data unavailability, research on social trust in developing countries remains limited. Apart from the studies cited above, we are not aware of other published developing country research regarding this question. 6 More importantly, we know nothing about the role of perceived institutional quality, religious schooling and inequality in the community --none of the published developing country studies cited in this section focus on these factors. Studies using WVS data (e.g. Wang and Gordon, 2011) Delavande and Zafar, 2015) . 8 At the same time, madrasa attendance may increase social polarization, since it is exclusive to Muslims. This is more likely in case of youths belonging to unrecognized Islamic schools who tend to live in closed communities, and allegedly lack exposure to secular media and the internet.
Third, villages across Bangladesh vary significantly in terms of geographic features and organizational structure (e.g. presence of natural barriers such as rivers, access to the sea, proximity to Hindu-majority Indian districts, NGO presence and so on). Religious mix of the population has varied due to historical factors.
Consequently, there exists variation at the community level in dimensions such as connection to urban centres, exposure to people from other faith groups, presence of religious institutions and the extent of economic development. The entry of NGOs in rural communities can be also expected to improve social trust in rural areas (Mondal, 2000; Kabeer and Matin, 2005) . NGO presence has arguably made up for poor governance in the social sector and at the same time brought community members closer and facilitated collective action.
7 In-group vs. out-group effects on trust have been studied in a laboratory setting (e.g. Smith, 2011; Tsutsui and Zizzo, 2014) . For a theory on how group membership relates to category based procedure of belief formation and perception of trust, see William (2001) . 8 Similarly Arbel, Bar-El, Siniver and Tobol (2014) report a positive association between religious education (and religiosity) and pro-social behaviour such as honesty in Israel.
Fourth, Bangladesh is one of the few developing countries to have experienced significant economic growth over the last twenty years. This positive growth spell followed from the fall of the autocratic regime and the subsequent transition to democracy in 1991. Yet, the quality of public institutions in the country remains poor, and this has led to unfavourable ranking in the global survey on corruption perceptions. 9 According to Knox (2009) 
Trust Measures, Sample and Data Description
Measuring trust using survey data
There are significant differences in the manner in which trust is defined by researchers across disciplines. In the economics literature, the act of trusting is seen as the combination of the prosocial preferences of the person (e.g. reciprocity, altruism) and his/her belief in other people's trustworthiness (Fehr, 2009; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, and Zingales 2013) . Trust has a strategic element as well as a 9 The 2011 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as 120 out of 143 countries.
11 moralistic component (Bulloch 2013) . According to Coleman (1990) , people calculate the gains and losses which might result from their decision to trust or not to trust others before they finalize their decision. However, Bachmann (2001) criticizes this conceptualization, arguing that trust should be seen as a mechanism that allows for social interaction instead of being viewed as a (potential) result of rational calculation. 10 An additional challenge arises in conceptualizing trust in cross-national research. Although trust as a general notion can be viewed as an "etic" or cultureneutral construct that can be universally applied, the specific form of trust, and the specific mechanisms of trust building, may be "emic" or culture/context/situation specific (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006; Saunders et al 2010; Bachmann and Zaheer 2013) .
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Given the debates on the concept of trust and its etic and emic determinants and consequences, how the level of, and disposition to, trust can be empirically measured also remains a contested issue in the related literature. A common approach to measuring inter-personal trust consists of surveying people on whether they trust strangers. Variants of this approach include combining survey items that explicitly refer to trusting behaviour such as lending money and personal belongings to friends (see Glaeser et al. 2000) . Naef and Jurgen (2009), and Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) , develop additional survey trust scales using three short sentences, and combining three survey measures of trust, respectively. Another approach used mostly in the economics literature directly investigates behaviours that reflect differing 12 degrees of trust. This involves fielding trust or investment games where the amount sent is seen as a measure of trust.
In addition to behavioural and survey measures, some researchers prefer a mixed methods approach. This is particularly useful to understand the varied ways in which religion, social distance and norms of trust interact with each other as it allows the concept and analysis of trust to be grounded in a local context (Obadia and Wood, 2011); Whaley and Longoria, 2009; Saunders and Thornhill, 2011 There may be unobserved characteristics of the local population that make inferences about behaviour rather difficult to generalize into other geographic regions (Henrich et al., 2010) .
13
Rajshahi and Khulna. Therefore we first randomly selected 12 districts from these divisions. 15 The probability proportional to size (PPS) method of random sampling was used, based on division/district level population data from the 2001 national population census. Two sub-districts were randomly selected from each of the selected 12 districts. Then two unions were randomly selected from each of the selected 24 sub-districts.
For each of the 48 sample Unions, we randomly selected two villages using PPS based on village-level population data from the 2001 national census. A complete census of all households was carried out in each sample village. From the census household frame, 25 households were randomly selected from each village. Then, a detailed multi-module household survey was administered (e.g., complete roster, education history, employment status, assets, consumption and so on). This led to detailed data on 2,400 households.
16
The main respondents were heads of sample households in our survey. In order to measure trust, we adapted the trust question used in the World Values Survey -"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?" The average response to the generalized trust question is the standard measure of social capital/trust in the empirical cross-country literature (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001 ). However, one may be concerned about the exact content of this measure of trust. A high level of trust produces a large amount of general trust given that the radius of trust is wide (Delhey et al 2011) . A survey respondent's interpretation of who "most people" are (or the trust radius) would differ under different circumstances in different societies (Glaeser et al., 2000; Beugelsdijk, 2006) . Moreover, respondents 14 of a given religious group can have low out-group trust and yet demonstrate high ingroup trust --response to the WVS trust question per se does not distinguish between particularized and generalized trust. The former refers to an intimate trust in people close to the truster and is described as thick trust. The latter is "diffuse trust" (i.e. an abstract trust in people in general). Nonetheless, evidence indicates a significant overlap between these two dimensions of interpersonal trust. In other words, individuals who place much trust in friends/family members/coreligionists are also more likely to trust people in general (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009; Sturgis and Smith, 2010) .
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To partially deal with some of the above issue, we go beyond a single-item measure of trust by incorporating a range of additional measures that specify the circle of "most people". This is based on answers to the question: "I will ask you how Lack of institutional trust can also be a proxy for lack of general (i.e. social) trust in rural areas. Therefore, we also repeat the WVS question on generalized trust (as discussed above) in the accompanying census conducted in our 96 sample villages. We then construct a measure of trust at the community level aggregating response to this from village census records. Lastly, dissatisfied individuals in rural Bangladesh may live in under-provided areas that lack access to basic infrastructure such as roads and health care facilities. Therefore, we additionally create an index of village development that ranges between 0 (no facilities) and 7 (having a police station, post office, health care centre, pucca road, telephone line, electricity and satellite dish). These aggregated indices are used in the regression analysis in Section 4 to account for factors that could confound the relationship between inter-personal and perceived institution trust.
To get a first insight in the relationship between trust and religious affiliation, The state and non-state institutions/organizations included in the index are widely believed to play critical role in the delivery of various public services and/or protecting citizen rights in rural Bangladesh; see for instance Knox (2009 ), Mondol (2000 , and Kabeer and Matin (2005) . As previously pointed out, Bangladesh has a poor system of governance. Individuals in their daily lives often have to deal with corrupt civil servants, and even use bribes to access public health facilities, legal services and secure protection from the police. Dysfunctional public institutions may in turn increase support for non-state institutions (e.g. NGOs, religious bodies).
separately by religious affiliation of the respondents. 19 A number of patterns emerge from Muslim faith communities. However, between-group differences could be driven by a number of factors. Analysis of summary statistics (see Appendix Table 2) does not suggest that, compared to Muslims, Hindus do not appear to be disadvantaged in terms of socio-economic indicators (such as education, household expenditure and so on). However, "Hindu villages" do have fewer mosques, and appear to be less developed in terms of provision of pucca roads. Most importantly, Hindus tend to live in villages with a higher proportion of non-Muslim households. As a matter of fact, the Hindu population in Bangladesh has a higher concentration in certain districts, some of which border the Hindu majority country India, and are isolated from the capital city, Dhaka. Fortunately, our sample households are drawn from a total of 12 districts, where four come from Rajshahi, Jessore and Barisal divisions, widely known as relatively backward regions of Bangladesh. Of the remaining, six belong to Dhaka and Chittagong divisions, which have experienced significant economic growth and large scale decline in poverty in the last decade. Households in these divisions also differ in terms of proximity to urban centres and markets. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Appendix Table 1 confirms significant variation across divisions in trust data.
This highlights the importance of employing a nationally spread out sample to study correlates of trust. At the same time, it raises the possibility that bivariate findings reported in Table 1 could be driven by between-religion differences in institutional trust, and other individual and community level correlates, and enumerator's religious identity. In the next section, we therefore discuss social and individual determinants of trust, but do so holding differences across divisions and districts constant.
Lastly, as discussed in Section 3.1, pro-sociality and the meanings of trust and distrust may vary across countries and religious communities in different ways. Given the universal and culture-specific aspects of trust (Ferrin and Gillespie, 2010) , additional modifications are required to account for emic constructs and local practices (Fulmer and Gelfand 2012) . In this study, we have not conducted focusgroup analysis with members of Hindu and Muslim communities to examine the "emic" aspect of trust. By adopting questions from the World Values Survey in a structured survey, our approach mostly presents an etic account of trust attitude, since we assume no ethnocentric bias. This remains a limitation of our data. Among other limitations, we were not able to distinguish between belief and preference-based trust, since it would additionally require panel data with information on past trusting behaviour, or an experimental design.
Regression results
In this section, we present ordered Probit regression estimates of the determinants of social trust. Responses to a total of eight trust-related questions are used as dependent variables. The main individual-specific covariates of interest are religious affiliation, educational status and confidence in institutions. These are based on regressions with extensive controls for a number of factors that are considered important in existing empirical studies on social trust as discussed in Section 2. These include individual characteristics such as marital status, age, gender and socio-economic conditions of the household such as per capita monthly expenditure, physical condition of the home, wealth relative to other villagers and experience of negative shock. To further investigate the effect of aggregate factors, we control for community characteristics such as the presence of pucca roads, electricity, NGO and non-Muslim population in the village, number of mosques in the village, village-level economic inequality and the village being semi-urban. In the subsequent section, we first discuss the results for the full sample, followed by a discussion of the determinants of trust in the Muslim sub-sample. Lastly, the section discuses results from robustness analysis.
Determinants of trust: full sample analysis
The main results are presented in Village economic development (proxied by road condition and electricity access) is not systematically associated to trust. Similarly, we find no evidence that more unequal villages (measuring in terms of land ownership) is associated with lower trust. We also revisited this result using educational inequality as an alternative proxy.
However, this did not yield a significant relationship between trust and inequality.
Here, an interesting finding is that NGO presence (defined in terms of presence of Note: (a) regressions include control for district fixed effects; (b) standard errors are clustered at the village level; (c) t-statistics in parenthesis; (d) regression model includes a square term of respondent age; (e) "trust NGO worker" regression uses a parsimonious version of the confidence index, ranging between 9 and 36, that takes out confidence in NGO from the index.
Determinants of trust: Muslim respondents
An important area in which Muslim societies differ from their Western counterparts is in the structure of the education system. Many are educated in Islamic schools that exclude students from non-Muslim faiths. This in turn can create social distance, and undermine inter-community faiths. Moreover, imams and clerics working in mosques and other religious institutions play an important role in community decision making in rural societies. Consequently, they are likely to have an influence in the way
Muslims value and engage with individuals outside their faith groups.
In order to better understand the factors that determine the level of trust among Muslims, the religious majority in Bangladesh, we reproduced results from Table 2 by discarding observations on Hindus. Results are reported in Table 3 . However, the regression specification is modified in three ways. First, in addition to the earlier measure of institutional trust, we now include an index capturing confidence in religious institutions (e.g. mosque). 24 Second, we include a measure of religiosity (i.e.
frequency of daily prayers). Lastly, we include an indicator to capture Islamic school attendance.
A number of findings follow from Table 3 . First, Muslims who report greater confidence in religious institutions are significantly more likely to trust fellow Muslims. But they trust non-Muslims (Hindu, Christian and Buddhist), NGO workers and foreigners significantly less. Moreover, they also trust people in general significantly less. Second, religious participation (measured by prayer frequency) appears to have no significant effect on social trust. This is consistent with Tan (2006) and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009). 25 It is also noteworthy that there are a few exceptions. Religious Muslims are more likely to trust strangers, but are significantly less likely to trust Hindus and Christians. Third, we find that madrasa graduates are significantly less likely to trust Hindus, Christians, Budhists, strangers, foreigners and NGO workers. Since our model already controls for household income, this finding is unlikely to reflect poorer socio-economic conditions of madrasa graduates.
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Meanwhile, Hindu-Muslim trust gaps remain even after we purge the sample of madrasa graduates, confirming that trust towards other religious groups is low across school types. 27 Overall, religious Muslims and those educated in madrasas do not demonstrate high particularised trust (i.e. trust towards their own kind) but they appear not to trust people who are different from themselves, hence showing outgroup discrimination.
25 Sarkissian (2012) also points out that daily prayer is associated with less civic engagement in some Muslim countries. 26 Our finding contrasts with the recent international evidence for other Muslim countries. Using experimental data on male students, Delavande and Zafar (2015) find that madrasa respondents in Pakistan are amongst the most trusting and expect others to be the most trustworthy compared to those belonging to non-madrasa institutions. Their finding could be partly owing to the fact that sample students belong to tertiary degree awarding madrasa and non-madrasa educational institutions in urban Pakistan. 27 In our sample, less than 4% of respondents were educated in a madrasa. 
Additional robustness checks
In this section, we put our finding through several robustness tests. First, concerns remain over the manner in whichanswers to trust questions in rural communities vary depending on who asked the question (e.g. female, non-Muslim enumerator and so on). The surveyors avoided overtly religious dresses so that they were not immediately recognizable as member of a particular faith group. Nonetheless, we repeated analysis presented in Table 2 with full control for enumerator fixed-effects.
Results confirmed that our earlier conclusions are robust to enumerator effects (see Appendix Table 3 ). Third, we test the hypothesis of "minority status" by looking into sub-region effects. If the observed difference in trust attitudes between Hindu and Muslim communities reflects minority and majority status, respectively, out-group bias should not vary significantly across regions. Our sample contains interior districts, as well as those bordering India, a Hindu majority country. Bordering regions have a greater concentration of Hindus, but at the same time, they are also less developed and are remote to the capital. We therefore split our respondents in two sub-samples containing either only bordering or interior districts, and estimate the relationship 27 between trust and religion separately on those two sub-populations (see Appendix community may trust Muslims less owing to have suffered traumatic experience of religious and political violence. But our data set contains no information on the history of such violence in sample villages; we at most control for economic shocks.
Second
Equally, the relationship between institutional and social trust can run the other way around as well Knack 2002; Beugelsdijk, 2006; Bjørnskov and Méon, 2013) . We are constrained by the cross-sectional nature of the data to address these issues.
Lastly, madrasa attendance itself may be an outcome of lack of trust in public institutions such as government schools. The negative coefficient on madrasa dummy may be a consequence of selection bias, if distrusting parents are more likely to send their children to religious schools and, as is known, likely to pass their distrust onto their children. To this end,
we attempted instrumenting the madrasa dummy in a IV-probit model using information on distance to secondary schools and madrasas when the respondent was 28 15 years old. However, the exclusion restriction was not satisfied in most cases, perhaps because the experience of being raised in under-provided and isolated communities itself undermined trusting behaviour. In the absence of other variables that we could use for identification purposes, the evidence presented remains descriptive, and not causal.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have used Bangladesh as a case study and empirically investigated the determinants of inter-personal trust. The measurement of trust is a contentious topic in the social science literature. Therefore, in addition to using the generalized trust question, we have employed questions to directly capture trust towards specific social groups. We find significant social distance among various faith groupsHindus, the minority, trust Muslims more than Muslims trust Hindus. We also find no evidence that Hindus are distrustful of the wider society, and of other non-Hindus in general. If anything, they trust non-Muslims of all denominations and NGO workers more compared to Muslims. These findings do not proxy for between religion differences in institutional trust. This is despite the fact that perceived institutional trust increases inter-personal trust in our data. Among Muslim respondents, the lack of trust towards Hindus and other non-Muslims is significantly and positively correlated with Islamic school attendance, while religiosity appears to play no role in this case. These findings are robust to control for a wide range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects. Altogether, our results suggest that mistrust between Bangladesh's two main religious communities, Muslims and Hindus, limits the scope for creating social capital in rural areas.
Nonetheless, we have highlighted two policy channels for fostering interpersonal trust. First, the significant association between institutional trust and social 29 trust suggests that policy reforms that reduce corruption may improve interpersonaltrust via increasing institutional trust in rural Bangladesh. Here policy measures against corruption such as social campaigns using the media and school curriculum reform to instil moral values can be effective (Narayan 2002) . Second, while we found no effect of years of schooling, madrasa attendance was negatively correlated with level of trust towards minority religious groups. If the madrasa effect is causal, this suggests that social trust can be fostered through appropriate educational reform programs. Curriculum reform targeting Islamic schools can improve generalized trust attitude among one segment of the Muslim population in Bangladesh. 28 Our study thus lends some support to the view that social trust in low income countries can be built through a combination of institutional and policy reforms.
It should be noted that the between-group difference in trust attitude documented in our paper could be also shaped by historical experience rather than the theology of respective religious groups. Only a small proportion of Bangladeshi Muslims attend Islamic schools (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2016) and we do not find a direct role of religiosity among Muslims on trust attitudes. This highlights the possibility that the role of religion in inculcating a trusting attitude can be ambiguous.
The between-group trust attitude can be driven by the actual experience of people rather than the theology of the particular religions. If so, legal and institutional reforms protecting minority rights and livelihoods can also play an important role.
Lastly, some researchers have cautioned against the etic approach when studying trust across respondents of different countries/cultures (e.g. Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006; Bachmann and Zaheer 2013 Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. index (non-religious institutions)" is calculated over seven domains and has a theoretical range of 7 (no confidence at all) and 28 (full confidence). (b) "Confidence index (religious institutions)" is calculated over two domains, religious institutions and religion based political party, and hence has a theoretical range of 2 (no confidence at all) and 8 (full confidence). 
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